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BLURRING THE LINES OF THE DANGER ZONE:
THE IMPACT OF KENDRA'S LAW ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE NONVIOLENT MENTALLY ILL
KRISTINA M. CAMPBELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the lives of Kendra Webdale and Andrew Goldstein
crossed paths in a New York City subway on January 3, 1999, no
one could have predicted the tragic results of their brief encoun-
ter, nor the political and legal aftermath the events of that day
would spur. According to eyewitnesses, Goldstein, a twenty-nine
year old man with a long history of psychiatric illness,'
approached Webdale, a thirty-two year old woman, to ask her the
time as she waited for an uptown train. Goldstein then suddenly
and- inexplicably pushed Webdale in front of the approaching
train; she died instantly.
2
Public outrage followed Webdale's death when the press dis-
covered that Goldstein, a diagnosed schizophrenic, had not been
taking his anti-psychotic medications at the time he committed
this horrific crime.3 After several other highly publicized inci-
dents in New York City involving violent outbursts by homeless,
mentally ill individuals,4 public support grew for a bill intro-
* B.A., 1997, Saint Mary's College; J.D. Candidate, 2002, Notre Dame
Law School; ThomasJ. White Scholar, 2000-2002. This Note is dedicated to my
family and friends, in thanks for their support and encouragement throughout
my life.
1. By all accounts, Andrew Goldstein had been in and out of the New
York mental health system for at least ten years. Mr. Goldstein had been hospi-
talized for schizophrenia no less than thirteen times in the two years before
Kendra Webdale's death, with his most recent stay only two weeks prior to her
murder. See, e.g., E. Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, We've Tried Mandatory
Treatment-and It Works, CITYJOURNAL, Summer 1999, at 82; Samuel Maull, Mis-
trial Declared In Fatal Subway Push, A.P. NEWSWIRES, Nov. 3, 1999, at 1.
2. The death of Kendra Webdale received much attention in both the
local and national media. See, e.g., Donna De La Cruz, New Yorkers Wary Following
Subway Death, A.P. NEwswIREs, Jan. 5, 1999, at 1 (detailing the events of Kendra
Webdale's death).
3. See, e.g., Outpatient Commitment Bill Dedicated to Kendra Webdale, A.P. NEw-
swiREs, Feb. 19, 1999, at 1.
4. On April 28, 1999, another individual with a history of mental illness,
Julio Perez, pushed Edgar Rivera in front of a subway train, severing his legs
and rendering him comatose. See Nina Bernstein, Frightening Echo in Tales of
Two Subway Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1999, at Al. A separate incident
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duced in the New York Legislature known as "Kendra's Bill."5
Kendra's Bill proposed an outpatient commitment program that
would require individuals with a history of mental illness to take
anti-psychotic medication or face involuntary civil commitment.
6
Kendra's Bill was passed by the New York Senate on August 9,
1999 and signed into law by New York Governor George Pataki
on August 27, 1999. 7 The bill then became known as "Kendra's
Law."
8
Since its passage, Kendra's Law has been both praised and
decried by the general public, the mentally ill, social service and
mental health agencies, advocates, and attorneys.9 Proponents
of Kendra's Law argue that the law accomplishes what it was
intended to do-give violent and potentially violent mentally ill
individuals the care they need, thus preventing innocent bystand-
ers from meeting the same fate as Kendra Webdale.' Con-
versely, opponents of Kendra's Law contend that because the law
contains a provision that allows for the potential confinement of
mentally ill individuals without a history of violence,11 the statute
as it is currently written poses a major threat to the liberty inter-
ests of the nonviolent mentally ill. 2 This is an area fertile for
debate. While there are several instances in which both the New
York Court of Appeals (New York State's highest court) and the
United States Supreme Court have outlined the minimum consti-
tutional requirements for involuntary inpatient commitment, 3
occurred on November 16, 1999, in which twenty-seven year old Nicole Barrett
was struck in the head with a brick while walking to work, allegedly by a home-
less man. See Larry McShane, Transplanted Texan Fights for Life After Brick Attack
in New York, A.P. NEWSWIREs, Nov. 18, 1999, at 1.
5. 1999 N.Y. A.B. 8477 and 1999 N.Y. S.B. 5762.
6. See id. See also Larajakes, Bills Would Mandate Care for Mentally Ill TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y), May 20, 1999, at B2.
7. See "Kendra's Law" Signed at Ceremony, 222 N.Y.L.J. 43 (1995).
8. N.Y. MENTAL HYc. LAw § 9.60 (McKinney 1999).
9. There have been numerous opinions published both for and against
the implementation of Kendra's Law. See, e.g., Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note
1 (endorsing Kendra's Law); Joe Glazer, Deadly Restraints, July/August 1999,
NEw YORK CITY VoicEs (criticizing Kendra's Law).
10. See Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 1.
11. § 9 .6 0 (c) (4) (i) provides that an individual may be hospitalized under
Kendra's Law if, in addition to meeting all other criteria of the statute, "the
patient has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental illness that
has: at least twice within the last thirty-six months been a significant factor in
necessitating hospitalization in a hospital." For Kendra's Law to be applicable
under this provision, no history of violence is necessary.
12. See "Position Statement on Involuntary Commitment," Bazelon
Center for Mental Health Law, available at http://www.bazelon.org/involcom.
html.
13. See infra Part III.
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no constitutional challenge to involuntary outpatient commit-
ment laws has yet reached the high court of either New York or
the United States. 4
This Note argues that Kendra's Law, which may potentially
be applied to mentally ill individuals without a history of vio-
lence, is overbroad and unconstitutional because it is inconsis-
tent with the state and federal constitutional standards for
deprivation of liberty, due process, and the right to refuse treat-
ment, as established by the New York Court of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court.
Part II of this Note examines the evolution of involuntary
outpatient commitment in New York under Kendra's Law,
including a comparison of how the statute differs substantially
from the 1994 pilot program'" on which it was modeled. Part III
will provide an overview of the federal constitutional standards
under which an individual may be deprived of his or her liberty
through involuntary inpatient commitment, and argue that these
standards should also be applied to individuals facing involuntary
outpatient commitment. It will also examine the possible con-
flict of Kendra's Law with New York state constitutional liberty
interests, the due process right to a competency hearing, and the
right to refuse treatment under Rivers v. Katz.'6 Finally, Part V
discusses the morality, as well as the efficacy, of coercive outpa-
tient treatment for the mentally ill in light of current public
policy.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF KENDRA'S LAW IN NEW YORK
The controversy surrounding Kendra's Law is not due to an
aversion to involuntary outpatient commitment laws in general,
but is rather a response to the way in which the New York Legisla-
ture chose to word the statute; it potentially includes mentally ill
people for whom treatment is not necessary to prevent imminent
violence. New York is not unique in choosing to enact an invol-
untary outpatient commitment law. At the time of this writing, at
least thirty-five states (and the District of Columbia) have laws
14. Although there currently is no precedent for determining the stan-
dards required for involuntary outpatient commitment under the New York
State Constitution, at the time of this writing a challenge to the constitutionality
of Kendra's Law is working its way through New York state courts. See Matter of
Urcuyo (James D.), 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
15. § 9.61.
16. 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
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providing for the involuntary outpatient commitment of men-
tally ill individuals.
17
However, most of the states with involuntary outpatient com-
mitment laws require that there be a finding of dangerousness
for an individual to be civilly committed under such a statute.18
The reason Kendra's Law has received so much criticism is due,
in large part, to the fact that New York, along with a minority of
the states having involuntary outpatient commitment laws, does
not require a finding of dangerousness to self or others for an
individual to be civilly committed. 9 A close examination of the
elements of New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.6020 reveals how
the wording of Kendra's Law allows it to be potentially applied to
mentally ill individuals without a history of violence, and why this
particular outpatient commitment law presents the greatest
threat of all outpatient commitment laws to the liberty interests
of nonviolent mentally ill citizens.21
A. The 1994 Pilot Program
Before the tragic meeting of Webdale and Goldstein in
1999, the idea of an involuntary outpatient commitment pro-
gram had already begun to take shape in the New York Legisla-
ture. In response to the recognition that many patients
hospitalized for mental illness are capable of leading normal,
productive lives outside of an inpatient setting, the state enacted
New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.61 in 1994.22 The stated pur-
17. See Mark Moran, Coercion or Caring? Kendra's Law is the Flash Point in a
Debate About Whether Outpatient Commitment Laws are Effective, AMERICAN MEDICAL
NEWS, Apr. 17, 2000, at 1.
18. See id. The following states require a finding of dangerousness for
involuntary outpatient commitment: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and West Virginia.
19. See id, The states that do not require dangerousness as an element of
involuntary outpatient commitment are: Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi,
Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas. See
id.
20. McKinney 1999.
21. See, e.g., Wendy Davis, Insanity Pleas: With Kendra's Law, Mental Hygiene
Courts Now Have Unprecedented Powers Over the Lives of the Mentally Ill-And a Long
Track Record of Shutting Them Out, CrTy LIMITs MAGAZINE, May 1999, available at
http://www.citylimits.org/mag/0005.davis.htm. "Contrary to tabloid opinion,
'dangerous' does not always mean violent. In particular, perfectly peaceful
homeless patients may be considered dangerous to themselves, because if they
are released they face the very real threat of victimization on the streets." Id.
22. McKinney 1994.
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pose of the pilot program was "to treat the person's mental ill-
ness and to assist the person in living and functioning in the
community,"23 and was only available to individuals "who have
been hospitalized at a hospital."
24
The criteria for involuntary outpatient commitment under
the pilot program were quite different than the current specifica-
tions set forth under Kendra's Law. The pilot program's criteria
for involuntary outpatient commitment are set forth in New York
Mental Hygiene Law § 9.61 (c), which reads as follows:
(1) A patient may be ordered to obtain involuntary outpa-
tient treatment if the court finds that:
(i) the patient is eighteen years of age or older;
and
(ii) the patient is suffering from a mental illness;
and
(iii) the patient is incapable of surviving safely in
the community without supervision, based on a
clinical determination; and
(iv) the patient is hospitalized at the hospital desig-
nated . to take part in the pilot project ...
and
(v) the patient has a history of lack of compliance
with treatment that has necessitated involun-
tary hospitalization at least twice within the last
eighteen months; and
(vi) the patient is, as a result of his or her mental
illness, unlikely to voluntarily participate in the
recommended treatment pursuant to the treat-
ment plan; and
(vii) in view of the patient's treatment history and
current behavior, the patient is in need of
involuntary outpatient treatment in order to
prevent a relapse or deterioration which would
be likely to result in serious harm to the patient
or others .. .; and
(viii) it is likely that the patient will benefit from
involuntary outpatient treatment; and
(ix) the involuntary outpatient treatment program
of such hospital is willing and able to provide




24. See id. § 9.61 (b).
25. § 9.61(c).
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Another restriction on the implementation of the outpatient
commitment pilot program was the stipulation that the court
may only order a mentally ill patient to take psychotropic drugs if
it was shown that the individual was not competent to make his
or her own treatment decisions, and that there were no less
intrusive means available:
A court may order the involuntary administration of
psychotropic drugs as part of an involuntary outpatient
treatment program if the court finds the hospital has
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the patient
lacks the capacity to make a treatment decision as a result
of mental illness and the proposed treatment is narrowly
tailored to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty
interest in refusing medication, taking into consideration
all relevant circumstances, including the patient's best
interest, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the
adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any
less intrusive alternative treatments.
26
By recognizing the liberty interest of competent mentally ill indi-
viduals to refuse treatment, the pilot program demonstrates that
an effort was made to take into consideration the capacity of the
mentally ill individual to make his or her own treatment
decisions.
Although there is no dangerousness requirement other than
the speculative component regarding prediction of future vio-
lence contained in § 9.61 (1) (c) (vii),27 the desire to preserve the
liberty interests of the mentally ill is expressed in the statutory
language and commitment criteria of the pilot program. The
pilot program reflects an understanding that not all those suffer-
ing from mental illness-even those who have been hospital-
ized-are necessarily incompetent, and therefore incapable of
making rational decisions regarding their treatment.
B. New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60: Kendra's Law
One of the main criticisms of the 1994 pilot program was
that while it failed to reach a significant proportion of the men-
tally ill population in the first place, too few of those eligible were
actually receiving the assistance the program was designed to
26. § 9.61 (c) (2).
27. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, infra note 30 (citing APA
Statement on Prediction of Dangerousness). "Psychiatrists have no special knowl-
edge or ability with which to predict dangerous behavior. Studies have shown
that even with patients in which there is a history of violent acts, predictions of
future violence will be wrong for two out of every three patients." Id.
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provide. 28 The hysteria generated by the death of Webdale and
other isolated incidents of violence perpetrated by mentally ill
individuals 29 contributed to the general public's perception that
mentally ill people were roaming the streets searching for vic-
tims. ° This hysteria led the New York Legislature to determine
that not enough was being done to control the violent mentally
ill. Therefore, when State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer pro-
posed legislation in honor of Kendra Webdale, ostensibly to pre-
vent a similar tragedy from occurring, the legislature concluded
that the pilot program was a failure and adopted the more strin-
gent New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60, also known as Ken-
dra's Law.
Kendra's Law, signed into law in August 1999, differs from
the 1994 pilot program in that it gives less recognition to the
liberty interests of the non-violent, competent mentally ill indi-
vidual. Unlike the pilot program, which specifically mentions
the importance of an individual's right to refuse treatment and
the exploration of less intrusive means,31 Kendra's Law fails to
mention these very important constitutional protections at all.32
The elimination of such safeguards makes Kendra's Law a sub-
stantial revision of the pilot program that potentially impinges
on the liberty interests of the nonviolent mentally ill.
The basic criteria of the pilot program and Kendra's Law are
similar. However, the elimination of the protective language pre-
sent in the pilot program is problematic.
The criteria for assisted outpatient treatment under Ken-
dra's Law, codified in New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60(c),
read as follows:
A patient may be ordered to obtain assisted outpatient
treatment if the court finds that:
28. ByJanuary 1999, only 198 patients had received orders for outpatient
commitment. SeeJennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administer-
ing a Lethal Dose to Kendra's Law, 68 FoiDHAm L. REv. 2401, 2412 (2000) (citing
E. Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, Kendra's Law-The Culmination of a 10-
Year Battle For Assisted Outpatient Treatment in New York, CATALYST: TREATMENT
ADvocAcy CENTER, Nov./Dec. 1999, at 3).
29. See Bernstein and McShane, supra note 4.
30. While the majority of people who commit violent acts are not men-
tally ill, and while most mentally ill people are not violent, there is the percep-
tion that most or all mentally ill people are violent. This belief is reinforced
through violent acts in movies and television committed by "insane" people,
and by fear and lack of knowledge about mental illness. See AMERICAN PSYCHIAT-
RIC ASSOCIATION FACTSHEET, Violence and Mental Illness, available at http://www.
psych.org (accessible in pdf file under "Public Information").
31. See§9.60(c)(2).
32. See § 9.60.
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(1) the patient is eighteen years of age or older; and
(2) the patient is suffering from a mental illness; and
(3) the patient is unlikely to survive safely in the commu-
nity without supervision, based on a clinical determi-
nation; and
(4) the patient has a history of lack of compliance with
treatment for mental illness that has:
(5) at least twice within the last thirty-six months been a
significant factor in necessitating hospitalization in a
hospital, or receipt of services in a forensic or other
mental health unit of a correctional facility or a local
correctional facility.., or;
(i) resulted in one or more acts of serious violent
behavior toward self or others or threats of, or
attempts at, serious physical harm to self or others
within the last forty-eight months .. .; and
(ii) the patient is, as a result of his or her mental ill-
ness, unlikely to voluntarily participate in the rec-
ommended treatment pursuant to the treatment
plan; and
(6) in view of the patient's treatment history and current
behavior, the patient is in need of assisted outpatient
treatment in order to prevent a relapse or deteriora-
tion which would be likely to result in serious harm to
the patient or others .. .; and
(7) it is likely that the patient will benefit from assisted
outpatient treatment; and
(8) if the patient has executed a health care proxy ... that
any directions included in such proxy shall be taken
into account by the court in determining the written
treatment plan.3 3
The criteria for involuntary outpatient commitment under
Kendra's Law are more specific than the pilot program regarding
dangerousness,3 4 which admittedly may offer more protection to
the nonviolent mentally ill in assessing whether an individual
qualifies for involuntary treatment. However, the absence of any
language acknowledging the mentally ill individual's right to
refuse treatment and access to less restrictive alternatives in the
text of Kendra's Law creates the potential for infringement on
their constitutional liberty interests.
In addition to the absence of language recognizing mentally
ill individuals' liberty interests in Kendra's Law, the incorpora-
33. § 9.60(c).
34. See § 9.61(c).
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tion of ambiguous language in the statute defining who is eligi-
ble for involuntary outpatient treatment has the potential to be
applied in an overbroad and indiscriminate manner. For exam-
ple, under the pilot program, a showing that the individual being
subjected to outpatient commitment "is incapable of surviving
safely in the community without supervision" was required.3" By
contrast, under Kendra's Law, it need only be shown that the
individual "is unlikely to survive safely in the community without
supervision. '"36 While the distinction is subtle, the possible
ramifications are great. Though both statutes require a "clinical
determination" of the individual's survival in the community, 7
the distinction between whether an individual is actually unable
to survive safely, or is merely unlikely to, can mean the difference
between civilly committing someone who is clearly incompetent
versus committing someone who may be deemed competent in
the subjective judgment of another.3 8
Another difference between the pilot program and Kendra's
Law is the expansion of the time frame during which an individ-
ual who has previously been hospitalized is eligible for outpatient
commitment. Under the pilot program, the individual's failure
to comply with treatment for mental illness "has necessitated invol-
untary hospitalization at least twice within the last eighteen
months.'' 39 Kendra's Law mandates that an individual's lack of
compliance with treatment for mental illness may subject him or
her to outpatient commitment if such noncompliance has "at
least twice within the last thirty-six months been a signicant factor
in necessitating hospitalization."4" By doubling the time frame
during which a mentally ill individual may be subject to a peti-
tion for outpatient commitment, and by making mental illness
merely a significant factor in necessitating hospitalization rather
than the primary cause, Kendra's Law continues to blur the line
between those who truly require outpatient commitment and
those who do not.
35. See § 9.61 (c) (1) (iii) (emphasis added).
36. See § 9.60(c)(3) (emphasis added).
37. See id. and § 9.61(c) (1) (iii).
38. One of the problems cited by opponents of Kendra's Law is the level
of subjectivity used to determine whether an individual is competent or not.
Under the statute as it is currently drafted, there is no objective test used to
determine competency. Supporters of the law argue that the statute itself serves
as an objective test. See, e.g., Eve Kupersanin, Outpatient Commitment Law Becomes
N. Y Battleground, PSYCHiATRiC NEws, Aug. 18, 2000, available at http://www.
psych.org/pnews/00-08-18/outpatient.html.
39. See § 9.61(c)(1)(v) (emphasis added).
40. See § 9.60(c)(4)(i) (emphasis added).
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While Kendra's Law contains the same speculative clause
regarding predictions of future violence outlined in the pilot
program,41 it also contains a provision that would allow for the
commitment of an individual whose lack of compliance with
treatment has resulted in violence or "threats of, or attempts at,
serious physical harm to self or others within the last forty-eight
months."4 2 This expansive time frame-four years-and the
loose criteria for potential involuntary outpatient commitment
that include "threats" and "attempts" of violence, make it easy for
such a provision to be abused. As a result, a generally nonvio-
lent, competent person may therefore face a substantial restric-
tion on his or her liberty if subjected to involuntary outpatient
commitment as codified in Kendra's Law.4"
The potential for abuse is made all the more likely because
of the many individuals who may, under Kendra's Law, petition
for the involuntary outpatient commitment of a mentally ill per-
son. While the pilot program specified that "an application to
obtain an order authorizing involuntary outpatient treatment
may be initiated only by the director of the hospital in which the
patient is hospitalized,"44 Kendra's Law provides that petitions
may be made by just about anyone involved in the mentally ill
person's private life.45
41. See § 9.60(c)(6) and § 9.61(c)(1)(viii).
42. See§ 9.60(c) (4) (ii).
43. The following is an example of such a restriction:
Imagine that you are sitting home watching television with your family.
You hear a knock at your door and think it is odd that someone is
knocking this late at night. You answer the door and it's a police
officer coming to take you to a psychiatric hospital. You have not hurt
anyone. Your family is safe and happy. The only "crime" you commit-
ted was that you did not want to live with the side effects of Lithium
and you chose to stop taking the drug prescribed for your bi-polar
disorder.
Gutterman, supra note 28 at 2401 (citing Elaine Sutton Mbionwu, Involuntary
Outpatient Commitment: If It Isn't Voluntay... Maybe It Isn't Treatment, 4 PROTEC,
TION & ADvocAcy SYSTEM NEWS 1, 1 (Winter 1999)). While such a scenario may
seem a bit paranoid to some, if such an encounter were to occur and was pre-
ceded by a domestic dispute in which "threats" were communicated (which may
or may not be the result of a "failure to comply with treatment"), under statutes
such as Kendra's Law, the situation at hand might seem less Orwellian than we
are first inclined to believe. See id.
44. See § 9.61(d)(1) (emphasis added).
45. See § 9.60(e) (Detailing the persons who may petition for involuntary
outpatient commitment of a mentally ill person. The list includes: adult room-
mates; parents, spouses, adult children and siblings; hospital directors; directors
of mental health organizations and charitable agencies; psychiatrists and others
supervising mental health care; the director of community services of the city or
BLURRING THE LINES OF THE DANGER ZONE
Since rational minds often disagree, it is highly likely that
someone close to a mentally ill individual might believe, for
example, that her decision to reduce her anti-depressant medica-
tion constitutes non-compliance when, for the patient herself,
such a choice is liberating. Allowing so many people to have a
potential say in intimate treatment decisions potentially threat-
ens the liberty interests and due process concerns of competent,
nonviolent persons who have a history of mental illness. If an
individual is faced with the possibility of having his or her right to
refuse medication taken away, there needs to be substantial pro-
tection given to that person's liberty interest in being free from
unwanted psychotropic medication.46 A law such as Kendra's
Law, which seeks to substantially limit the autonomy of an indi-
vidual to make his or her own treatment decisions, must also
include a safeguard to protect the due process rights of compe-
tent individuals who may be subject to involuntary treatment at
the request of a third party.
47
The goal of allowing so many people to petition for the
involuntary outpatient commitment of a mentally ill individual is
a noble one: to prevent anyone else from becoming seriously
injured at the hands of a person in the grip of psychosis. How-
ever, Kendra's Law in its current form is fatally flawed because
the overbroad statutory language makes it applicable to a class of
mentally ill people for whom it should not apply. Kendra's Law
should focus on the population it was intended to address-the
mentally ill with a demonstrated history of consistent violence
and refusal to seek and/or maintain treatment-and should be
narrowly tailored to suit this end.4"
county in which the petitioned individual resides; and the individual's parole or
probation officer.).
46. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
47. See id.
Under liberal statutes such as Kendra's Law, participants in outpatient
commitment programs are neither imminently dangerous nor incapa-
ble of making informed decisions to refuse medication. Arguably, the
exigencies invoked by the Harper Court to justify deference in the
forcible administration of medication to control violence are often not
present in the community setting. Therefore, outpatients would
appear to be entitled to the most exacting standard of review, and are
thus deserving of strict judicial scrutiny.
See Gutterman, supra note 28, at 2422.
48. See Matter of Sullivan (Jesus A.), in which the trial judge held that "the
specificity in pleading required under Kendra's Law is not to be taken lightly."
710 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) The judge held that an affidavit by
the patient's physician, stating that the patient "has a long history of noncom-
pliance with aftercare, follow-up, and medications which has led to physically
2002]
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III. KENDRA'S LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
GOVERNING INVOLUNTARY INPATIENT COMMITMENT
Kendra's Law, as stated before, is not unique because of its
nature as an involuntary outpatient commitment statute.49 What
makes Kendra's Law particularly troublesome is its statutory lan-
guage. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution, through the Due Process Clause, requires the states to
recognize an individual's liberty interest to be free from the arbi-
trary administration of psychotropic medication.5" However, the
states are given the power to administer the laws as they see fit
through their legislative bodies. 1
Despite the lack of a clear federal constitutional standard
governing involuntary outpatient commitment, many state legis-
latures have chosen to model their outpatient commitment stat-
utes on their inpatient commitment statutes.52 By applying the
same criteria to involuntary outpatient commitment as the state
does to inpatient commitment, the goal of providing an alterna-
tive treatment through less restrictive means than hospitalization
is offered for the same class of people." Since such dispositional
alternative 54 approaches to involuntary outpatient commitment
usually mirror the state involuntary inpatient commitment stat-
ute, there are generally no substantive challenges made to the
constitutionality of such laws since the due process requirements
are almost always satisfied under such an analysis.
Kendra's Law, however, is not a dispositional alternative to
hospitalization. Rather, Kendra's Law is the type of involuntary
outpatient commitment law that would best be categorized as a
preventive commitment law.55 Preventive commitment laws gen-
erally apply a lower standard to involuntary outpatient commit-
violent behavior resulting in hospitalizations and criminal incarcerations" were
merely "broad, simple, conclusory statements." Id. at 857.
49. See supra notes 19 and 20.
50. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210 (1990).
51. As stated in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979), "The essence
of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to
problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold. As the substantive
standards for civil commitment may vary from state to state, procedures must be
allowed to vary so long as they meet the constitutional minimum."
52. See Geraldine A. McCafferty & Jeanne Dooley, Involuntary Outpatient




55. Id. at 281.
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ment than is required for involuntary inpatient commitment.56
As is the case in Kendra's Law, preventive commitment laws often
give the courts the power to civilly commit an individual who is
not currently dangerous, but whom the court believes could
become dangerous without treatment.
57
Such a speculative standard of dangerousness for outpatient
commitment raises serious questions regarding liberty and due
process.58 Until the United States Supreme Court rules on the
constitutional parameters governing involuntary outpatient treat-
ment, the same rights guaranteed to those facing involuntary
inpatient commitment should be given to those facing involun-
tary outpatient commitment because of the substantial liberty
interests involved in the forced administration of medication to
nonviolent individuals who are competent to make their own
treatment decisions.
A. Due Process Concerns Arising Under Kendra's Law
1. The Right to Refuse Treatment
In Mills v. Rogers, 9 the United States Supreme Court held
that the Constitution "recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs."6 ° Although
the holding in Mills only extends specifically to mentally ill inpa-
tients, 6' a strong argument can be made that the due process
protections given to inpatients should be extended to outpatients
as well. Since the liberty interest of an outpatient is at least equal
to, if not greater than, that of an inpatient, statutes such as Ken-
dra's Law should be required to protect an individual's right to
refuse treatment.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution prohibits the government from
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law.62  In Washington v. Harper,63 the United States
Supreme Court held that inmates "possess a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
56. Id.
57. Id. "This approach is particularly dependent on the assumption that
dangerousness can be reliably predicted." Id.
58. The United States Supreme Court has held that in order for an indi-
vidual to be subject to involuntary inpatient commitment, there must be a find-
ing of both mental illness and dangerousness, See infra Part III.A.1.
59. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
60. Id. at 299.
61. See id. at 298-99.
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. ' 64 However, as long as the methods used by the State to
administer the antipsychotic drugs meet the demands of the Due
Process Clause, the federal Constitution provides "no greater
right than that recognized under state law."
65
The Court in Harper found that the procedures established
by the State of Washington for administering medication without
consent of an inmate were consistent with the Due Process
Clause.66 The Court held that the procedures established by the
State were constitutional because they permitted a psychiatrist to
treat an inmate with antipsychotic drugs against his wishes only if
he is found to be both mentally ill and gravely disabled or dan-
gerous.67 In the Court's opinion, this policy "creates a justifiable
expectation on the part of the inmate that the drugs will not be
administered unless those conditions are met,"' and that requir-
ing the state to prove both of these conditions before forcibly
administering antipsychotic medication "is a rational means of
furthering the State's legitimate objectives."6 9  Therefore,
although an inmate's due process right to refuse medication is
not absolute, the state must show that it has an obligation-not
merely an interest-in administering medication to justify
depriving a person of his or her liberty.7°
In Youngberg v. Romeo,7" the Court held that "liberty from
bodily restraint has always been recognized as the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary gov-
ernmental action .... This interest survives criminal conviction
and incarceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary com-
mitment."72 Kendra's Law is troubling when viewed in light of
the due process standards set forth by the Court for several rea-
sons. First, the Youngberg decision makes it clear that even those
who have suffered a substantial deprivation of liberty-incarcer-
ated criminals-still have a liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. 73 A strong
argument can be made that if such a liberty interest exists for an
64. Id. at 221-22.
65. Id. at 222.
66. See id. at 222-23 ("These standards, which recognize both the pris-
oner's medical interests and the State's interests, meet the demands of the Due
Process Clause.").
67. Id. at 220 (citing Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488-91).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 226.
70. See id. at 225.
71. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
72. Id. at 316.
73. See id.
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individual who is imprisoned or involuntarily committed, then
certainly individuals who are not incarcerated should enjoy at
least as much due process when faced with forced administration
of psychotropic drugs. Kendra's Law falls short of adequately
addressing such liberty interests because even though it provides
for administrative procedures before an individual may be forci-
bly medicated, its text fails to even mention the individual's right
to refuse treatment.
Of course, the liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs
is not absolute, and can be overridden if the state can satisfy
Harpers twin tests of: 1) dangerousness, and 2) compelling state
interest necessitating the forced administration of drugs.74 Ken-
dra's Law is problematic in light of these tests because it does not
set forth rigid enough standards by which dangerousness should
be measured, and it likewise fails to enumerate what standard
must be met for the state to meet the level of "compelling State
interest." In Harper, the Court held that "the extent of a pris-
oner's right under the Clause to avoid the unwanted administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs must be defined within the context of
the inmate's confinement."75 When analyzed under this stan-
dard, Kendra's Law fails to provide adequate due process protec-
tion to individuals facing involuntary outpatient commitment.
Additionally, the criteria established in Kendra's Law for
determining dangerousness for those facing involuntary outpa-
tient commitment-whether an individual has been hospitalized
in the recent past-falls far short of the type of inquiry that
should be mandated when the liberty and autonomy of an indi-
vidual is at stake. At a minimum, Kendra's Law should be rewrit-
ten to ensure that the standards for involuntary administration of
psychotropic drugs in Harper are met.
B. Federal Constitutional Standards Governing Involuntary
Inpatient Commitment Laws
1. O'Connor v. Donaldson
Due process requires that states not allow mentally ill indi-
viduals to be involuntarily committed in an inpatient facility with-
out a finding of dangerousness.76 In O'Connor v. Donaldson,77 the
United States Supreme Court held that "[a] finding of mental
illness alone cannotjustify locking a person up against his will...
[;] there is... no constitutional basis for confining such persons
74. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 220.
75. Id. at 222.
76. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
77. Id.
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involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely
in freedom."78 O'Connor was a watershed case in affirming the
rights of the mentally ill to be treated with fairness and dignity.
Recognizing the tremendous liberty interests at stake when some-
one is facing involuntary commitment, the Court held that "a
State cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends."79
If this standard of dangerousness is applicable to individuals
facing involuntary inpatient commitment, the same standard of
dangerousness should be applied to those facing involuntary out-
patient commitment. The O'Connor Court held that "involuntary
commitment to a mental hospital, like involuntary confinement of
an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the
State cannot accomplish without due process of law." 80 Because
involuntary outpatient commitment laws such as Kendra's Law
allow for the potential of forced administration of psychotropic
drugs,8' due process rights come into play that require justifica-
tion for state intervention.82
Without a requirement of dangerousness, it is difficult for
the state to justify civil commitment: "Commitment must be justi-
fied on the basis of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons for
committing a particular individual must be established in an
appropriate proceeding."83 Simply because an individual faces
commitment in an outpatient setting, rather than an inpatient
setting, does not diminish his or her right to liberty under the
Constitution.84
By not including dangerousness as a prerequisite for invol-
untary outpatient commitment under Kendra's Law, the New
York Legislature has reduced the liberty interests of the nonvio-
lent mentally ill by potentially subjecting them to commitment in
violation of O'Connor. Therefore, if involuntary outpatient com-
mitment laws are to be held to the same constitutional standard
78. Id. at 575.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 580 (Burger, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
81. See § 9.600)(4) ("A court may order the patient to self-administer
psychotropic drugs or accept administration of such drugs by authorized per-
sonnel as part of an assisted outpatient treatment program.").
82. See Gutterman, supra note 28, at 2435 ("Bodily restraints, such as
involuntary medication, implicate due process rights, which require some gov-
ernmental justification.").
83. 422 U.S. at 580 (Burger, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 586.
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as involuntary inpatient commitment laws, Kendra's Law is
unconstitutional because it allows for the civil commitment of
mentally ill people without a finding of dangerousness.
2. Addington v. Texas
The next major case concerning the rights of mentally ill
people facing civil commitment to come before the United States
Supreme Court after O'Connor was Addington v. Texas.85 In Add-
ington, the Court held that it was necessary to apply a "clear and
convincing" standard of proof that an individual is both mentally
ill and dangerous for an involuntary inpatient commitment pro-
ceeding to satisfy due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 6 While New York requires that the "clear and convincing"
standard of dangerousness be employed for inpatient commit-
ment proceedings," v thus meeting the constitutional burden of
proof established in Addington, there is no such standard of proof
required for an involuntary outpatient under Kendra's Law.88
The language of Addington itself warns against the danger
inherent in allowing individuals to face potential civil commit-
ment without adhering to a rigorous standard of due process.8 "
The Addington Court recognized that one of the perils of permit-
ting individuals to be civilly committed without a "clear and con-
vincing" standard is that a competent, nonviolent person might
face a loss of liberty due to a few isolated incidents that, standing
alone, would not justify involuntary inpatient commitment:
"IT] here is the possible risk that the factfinder might decide to
commit an individual based solely on a few isolated incidents of
unusual conduct. Loss of liberty calls for a showing that the indi-
vidual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated
by idiosyncratic behavior."'
Because Kendra's Law allows the potential for involuntary
hospitalization of individuals who are found to be in noncompli-
ance with their treatment programs ordered as part of their out-
patient commitment, the risk of a mentally ill person being
deprived of his or her liberty due to an "isolated incident of unu-
85. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
86. Id. at 427.
87. See Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
88. See § 9.60(c) (outlining the requirements for determination of invol-
untary outpatient commitment under Kendra's Law).
89. See 441 U.S. at 425 ("This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection.").
90. Id. at 426-27.
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sual conduct" is great.9" In addition, without the requirement of
a "clear and convincing" standard of dangerousness written into
the statutory language of Kendra's Law, what may be merely "idi-
osyncratic behavior" could be characterized as potentially violent
behavior that could result in the deprivation of an individual's
liberty by subjecting him or her to involuntary outpatient com-
mitment.92 Thus, if involuntary outpatient commitment laws are
to be held to the same constitutional standards as involuntary
inpatient commitment laws, Kendra's Law is unconstitutional for
its failure to apply a "clear and convincing" standard for deter-
mining both dangerousness and noncompliance.
The Addington Court also stated that "the State has no inter-
est in confining individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally
ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others."93
Although this statement appears to be dicta in the Addington
decision, and "the State" refers specifically to Texas (the state
involved in the litigation)," the Court in Jones v. United State 5
stated that the Court in Addington held "that the Due Process
Clause requires the Government in a civil-commitment proceed-
ing to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
individual is mentally ill and dangerous,"96 and used that as a
basis for establishing the constitutional standards for civil
commitment.
97
Therefore, although it is unclear whether the court in Add-
ington intended to say that the standard of requiring a showing of
both mental illness and dangerousness was specific to Texas or
whether it applied to all civil commitment laws in general, 8 Jones
holds that these are the requirements that must be demonstrated
for involuntary inpatient commitment. 99 Since Kendra's Law
fails to contain a provision in which it must be demonstrated by
91. See McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 52, at 278 ("Due process con-
cerns become particularly acute in those instances where a person committed
to IOC [involuntary outpatient commitment] fails to comply with the ordered
treatment.").
92. See § 9.60(c) (outlining the requirements for determination of invol-
untary outpatient commitment under Kendra's Law).
93. 441 U.S. at 426.
94. See id.
95. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
96. Katherine P. Blakey, Note, The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous
Sex Offenders is an Inappropriate Legal Compromise Between "Mad" and "Bad'--A
Study of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 227, 275 (1996) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 362) (citing Add-
ington, 441 U.S. at 426-27).
97. See id. at n.216.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 275 (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 362).
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"clear and convincing" evidence that an individual facing invol-
untary outpatient commitment is both mentally ill and danger-
ous, it fails to meet the due process standards set forth by
Addington for involuntary commitment under the federal
Constitution.
Because there is currently no set of federal guidelines for
determining whether state involuntary outpatient commitment
laws conform with the United States Constitution, the only way to
protect the liberty and due process rights of mentally ill people
facing such confinement is to apply the standards governing
involuntary inpatient commitment the Supreme Court gave in
O'Connor and Addington. Until the Supreme Court sets forth dif-
ferent rules under which the mentally ill may be subjected to out-
patient commitment without compromising their constitutional
rights, such laws must be evaluated under the involuntary inpa-
tient commitment standards. Kendra's Law does not provide for
the "clear and convincing" standard of mental illness and dan-
gerousness outlined by the Supreme Court as necessary for
ensuring due process and is therefore unconstitutional.
C. New York State Constitutional Standards Governing Involuntary
Inpatient Commitment
While the constitutionality of Kendra's Law is ambiguous
when viewed in light of the federal standards for subjecting indi-
viduals to involuntary inpatient commitment, the legality of the
statute is even more questionable when examined under New
York state law. The New York State Constitution provides per-
sons who are committed involuntarily the right to refuse medica-
tion unless there is a compelling state interest in using police
power to force them to do so.100 It is also well-established under
state law that for a mentally ill person to be involuntarily civilly
committed, the state bears the burden of showing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the individual poses a substantial
threat of physical harm to himself or to others.1 °1 When viewed
in light of the language of the leading state case addressing the
rights of persons who face involuntary civil commitment to refuse
medication, Rivers v. Katz,"°2 the failure of Kendra's Law to pro-
vide for a competency determination before subjecting a men-
tally ill person to involuntary outpatient commitment raises
issues of substantive due process.
100. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (1986).
101. See generally, Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
102. 495 N.E.2d 337 (1986).
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1. Rivers v. Katz
The issue brought before the Court of Appeals of New York
in Rivers v. Katz was "whether and under what circumstances the
State may forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs."1 °3 Rivers
involved a challenge by several individuals who were committed,
against their will, to state psychiatric hospitals for treatment of
their mental illness. 10 4 After refusing to be medicated with antip-
sychotic drugs, the appellants sought administrative review but
were overruled, and were eventually medicated against their
will.'10 The appellants then sought to enjoin the state psychiatric
hospital from administering antipsychotic drugs without their
consent, based on their common law and constitutional right to
refuse medication. 0 6 The complaint was dismissed on respon-
dents' motion for summary judgment, with the lower court hold-
ing that "involuntary retention orders necessarily determined
that these patients were so impaired by their mental illness that
they were unable to competently make a choice in respect to
their treatment."'0 7 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Article I, § 6 of the New York State Constitution 0 8 guarantees
the mentally ill a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic
medication.
The holding in Rivers is extremely important in analyzing
the substantive due process implications of Kendra's Law on
mentally ill individuals who face involuntary outpatient commit-
ment. There are two major substantive due process rights identi-
fied in Rivers that should be afforded to those facing involuntary
outpatient commitment as well as involuntary inpatient commit-
ment-the right to refuse medication and the right to a determi-
nation of competency.
a. The Right to Refuse Medication
The court in Rivers stated that "[i]t is a firmly established
principle of the common law of New York that every individual
'of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body' and to control the course of his
medical treatment."'0 9 Although some might argue that the
103. 495 N.E.2d at 339.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 339-40.
106. See id. at 340.
107. Id.
108. N.Y. CONST. ART. I § 6.
109. 495 N.E.2d at 341 (citing Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105
N.E. 92 (1914)).
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"sound mind" provision does not apply to the mentally ill, the
court saw otherwise:
[I] t is the individual who must have the final say in respect
to decisions regarding his medical treatment in order to
insure that the greatest possible protection is accorded his
autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with
the furtherance of his own desires .... This right extends
equally to mentally ill persons who are not to be treated as
persons of lesser status or dignity because of their
illness.
1 10
Therefore, the Rivers decision firmly establishes that the mentally
ill have a right to refuse medication, and that their mental illness
alone is not enough to deny them this basic constitutional right.
The court in Rivers did recognize, however, that "the right to
reject treatment with antipsychotic medication is not absolute
and under certain circumstances may have to yield to compelling
State interests."1" Proponents of Kendra's Law maintain that an
individual who meets the qualifications for involuntary outpa-
tient commitment under Mental Hygiene § 9.60 may be com-
pelled to take antipsychotic medication against his or her will
because the State's interest in protecting the health and safety of
the general public is greater than the individual's right to refuse
medication. 1 2 This position presupposes, presumably, that the
mentally ill individual is a danger to himself or others. However,
as was discussed previously,' Kendra's Law may potentially
apply in some circumstances to the nonviolent mentally ill.
Therefore, under the law as it is currently written, non-danger-
ous persons may be forced to take antipsychotic medication in
violation of their constitutional right to refuse treatment.
Defenders of Kendra's Law also claim that it may sometimes
be necessary to medicate persons against their will because their
inability to recognize their mental illness constitutes an "emer-
gency," and medication is the only way to prevent their condition
from deteriorating.1' 4 However, the Rivers court asserts that what
constitutes an emergency must clearly demonstrate that the
State's interest is compelling enough to override the liberty inter-
ests of the individual: "[T]he most obvious example . . . is an
emergency situation, such as when there is imminent danger to a
110. Id.
111. Id. at 343.
112. See generally, Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 1 (discussing the effi-
cacy of coercive treatment).
113. See supra Part II.A.
114. See, e.g., Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 1, at 3.
2002]
194 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16
patient or other in the immediate vicinity. Under these circum-
stances, the State's police power would justify forced medication,
albeit temporarily-continuing only as long as the emergency
persists."115 The court clarified in a footnote what kinds of emer-
gency situations generally do not constitute a compelling State
interest: "[T]he State's interest in providing a therapeutic envi-
ronment, in preserving the time and resources of the hospital
staff, in increasing the process of deinstitutionalization and in
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession, while
important, cannot outweigh the fundamental individual rights
here asserted."11 6
One of the legislature's stated goals in the creation of Ken-
dra's Law was to provide a mechanism for better community
mental health treatment."1 7 While this is an admirable goal, and
improved community mental health services will certainly benefit
both the mentally ill and the general public in the long run, it is
not enough on its own to justify compromising an individual's
right to refuse medication.
The legislature also specifically mentions the nonviolent
mentally ill in the legislative history and notes of Kendra's Law,
thus eradicating any doubt as to whether or not Kendra's Law as
it is currently written can apply to nonviolent persons:
The legislature further finds that many mentally ill persons
are more likely to enjoy recovery from non-dangerous, tempo-
rary episodes of mental illness when they are engaged in plan-
ning the nature of the medications, programs or
treatments for such episodes with assistance and support
from family, friends, and mental health professionals.'
1 8
This language strongly suggests that the legislature intended
Kendra's Law to apply to the nonviolent mentally ill, who, under
the authority of Rivers, have a constitutional right to refuse medi-
cal treatment. Thus, when viewed in light of the standards gov-
erning involuntary inpatient commitment, Kendra's Law violates
115. 495 N.E. 2d at 343.
116. Id. at 343 n.6.
117. As stated in the Historical and Statutory Notes of § 9.60:
Effective mechanisms for accomplishing these ends include: the estab-
lishment of assisted outpatient treatment as a mode of treatment;
improved coordination of care for mentally ill persons living in the
community; the expansion of the use of conditional release in psychi-
atric hospitals; and the improved dissemination of information
between and among mental health providers and general hospital
emergency rooms.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
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the liberty interests of outpatients to refuse the right to
medication.
The decision in Rivers holds that "due process requires that a
court balance the individual's liberty interest against the State's
asserted compelling need on the facts of each case to determine
whether such medication may be forcibly administered."1 9 The
court in Rivers refused to find that the State's interest was com-
pelling enough to override appellant's right to refuse treatment
when the drugs were being administered "'in order to bring
about a reintegration of [the patient's] current psychotic disor-
der,' and to 'improve' [the patient's] condition and thus facili-
tate [the patient's] return to the community. 1 20 The court also
failed to find a compelling State interest sufficient to overrule
the patient's wishes when medication is administered because
the patient is "'seriously mentally ill' and [the patient's] condi-
tion 'would deteriorate if such medication were discontinued or
provided in a different manner.' "121
One of the stated goals of subjecting a mentally ill individual
to involuntary outpatient commitment under Kendra's Law is:
"[T] o treat the person's mental illness and to assist the person in
living and functioning in the community, or to attempt to pre-
vent a relapse or deterioration that may reasonably be predicted
to result in suicide or the need for hospitalization."
1 22
Under the standards set forth in Rivers, such aspirations,
while noble, are not enough to deprive mentally ill persons of
their right to refuse medication. Therefore, as it is currently
written, Kendra's Law poses a serious threat to the liberty inter-
ests of the nonviolent mentally ill's state and federal constitu-
tional right to refuse medical treatment.
b. The Right to a Determination of Competency
In addition to its determination that the mentally ill have a
right to refuse medication, the court in Rivers took the important
step of distinguishing mental illness from incompetence. The
court recognized that "many mentally ill persons retain the
capacity to function in a competent manner,"' 23 and rejected the
notion that simply because one is mentally ill, a determination of
incompetence must automatically follow:
119, 495 N.E.2d at 344.
120. Id. at 343.
121. Id.
122. § 9.60(a)(1).
123. 495 N.E.2d at 342.
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[R] espondents ... argue that an involuntarily committed
mental patient is presumptively incompetent to exercise this
right [to refuse medication] since in ordering involuntary
retention, the court has implicitly determined that the
patient's illness has so impaired his judgment as to render
him incapable of making decisions regarding treatment
and care. We conclude, however, that neither the fact that
appellants are mentally ill nor that they have been involun-
tarily committed, without more, constitutes a sufficient
basis to conclude that they lack the mental capacity to com-
prehend the consequences of their decision to refuse med-
ication .... 124
Kendra's Law is flawed in light of the court's argument: it has no
provision for allowing individuals facing involuntary outpatient
commitment to undergo a determination of competency,
12 5
because it has the effect of presupposing that every mentally ill
person committed under the statute is incompetent to make his
or her own treatment decisions. Thus, the lack of a competency
hearing raises serious issues about substantive due process for
individuals facing involuntary outpatient commitment under
Kendra's Law.
The decision in Rivers also makes the important point that
simply because an individual may require hospitalization for
mental illness does not mean that one is incapable of making
treatment decisions, a corollary that is implicit in Kendra's Law
because it allows for forced medication of involuntary outpa-
tients. 126 The court observed that:
Although the historic view of many courts and psychiatrists
was that a commitment decision necessarily includes a
determination of incompetency, the nearly unanimous
modern trend in the courts, and among psychiatric and
124. Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added).
125. Although an individual cannot be committed involuntarily under
Kendra's Law without a hearing, the hearing is to determine whether the indi-
vidual is mentally ill and is not a competency hearing. Therefore, it is quite
possible that mentally ill individuals who are competent to make their own
treatment decisions may be subjected to coercive medical treatment. See
§ 9.60(h) (1).
126. As stated in Kendra's Law:
A court may order the patient to self-administer psychotropic drugs or
accept the administration of such drugs by authorized personnel as
part of an assisted outpatient treatment program. Such order may
specify the type and dosage range of such psychotropic drugs and such
order shall be effective for the duration of such assisted outpatient
treatment.
§ 9.60 0) (4).
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legal commentators is to recognize that there is no signifi-
cant relationship between the need for hospitalization of
mentally ill patients and their ability to make treatment
decisions. Indeed, there is considerable authority within
the psychiatric community that from a medical point of
view no relationship necessarily exists between the need
for commitment and the capacity to make treatment deci-
sions .... Professor Brooks points out that "there is ample
evidence that many patients, despite their mental illness
are capable of making rational and knowledgeable deci-
sions about medications. The fact that a mental patient
may disagree with the psychiatrist's judgment about the
benefit of medication outweighing the cost does not make
the patient's decision incompetent. " 127
Because Kendra's Law merely requires a hearing to determine
whether a mentally ill individual will "benefit" from involuntary
outpatient commitment without also requiring a determination
of competency, 128 it is very likely that Kendra's Law will be used
to force competent mentally ill individuals to be subjected to
unwanted medical treatment.
The current version of Kendra's Law also allows the State to
exercise its police power and parens patriae power over involunta-
rily committed outpatients without the determination of compe-
tency required under Rivers.129 The court in Rivers held:
127. 495 N.E.2d at 342 (citing Brooks, Constitutional Right to Refuse Antip-
sychotic Medications, 8 BuLL. OF AM. AcAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 191).
128. See § 9.60(c)(7) ("Criteria for assisted outpatient treatment. A
patient may be ordered to obtain assisted outpatient treatment if the court finds
that . .. it is likely that the patient will benefit from assisted outpatient
treatment.").
129. As stated in § 9.60(h)(3):
If the subject of the petition does not consent and the court finds
reasonable cause to believe that the allegations in the petition are
true, the court may order peace officers, acting pursuant to their spe-
cial duties, or police officers who are members of an authorized police
department or force, or of a sheriff's department to take the subject of
the petition into custody and transport him or her to a hospital for
examination by a physician.
§ 9.60(n) also supports this contention:
Failure to comply with assisted outpatient treatment. Where in the
clinical judgment of a physician, the patient has failed or has refused
to comply with the treatment ordered by the court . . .Upon the
request of such physician, the director ... may direct peace officers,
when acting pursuant to their special duties, or police officers who are
members of an authorized police department or force, or of a sheriff's
department to take into custody and transport any such person to the
hospital operating the assisted outpatient treatment program ....
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For the State to invoke [its parens patriae power], 'the indi-
vidual himself must be incapable of making a competent
decision concerning treatment on his own. Otherwise, the
very justification for the state's purported exercise of its
parens patriae power-its citizen's inability to care for him-
self... would be missing. Therefore, the sine qua non for
the state's use of its parens patriae power as justification for
the forceful administration of mind-affecting drugs is a
determination that the individual to whom the drugs are to
be administered lacks the capacity to decide for himself
whether he should take drugs.' . . . We hold, therefore,
that in situations where the State's police power is not
implicated, and the patient refuses to consent to the
administration of antipsychotic drugs, there must be ajudi-
cial determination of whether the patient has the capacity
to make a reasoned decision with respect to proposed
treatment before the drugs may be administered pursuant
to the State's parens patriae power.
1 30
Although it may be argued that Kendra's Law does not violate
the holding in Rivers that there must be ajudicial determination
of competency because the State's police power is lawfully
invoked under the statute, it seems as if the State may have the
occasion under Kendra's Law to invoke its parens patriae power
without the requisite compelling State interest.131 Since a com-
petency hearing is required before the State may use its police
power to override the wills of involuntarily committed inpatients,
it follows that protection of such liberties should also be
extended to those facing involuntary outpatient commitment
under Kendra's Law.
Because Kendra's Law does not provide for a competency
hearing as part of the involuntary outpatient commitment proce-
dure, there is a danger that competent individuals may have their
substantive due process right to refuse treatment and right to a
determination of competency compromised or taken away
entirely. While the standards set forth in Rivers were intended
for governing the procedures regarding involuntary inpatient
commitment, if Kendra's Law is truly an alternative treatment
offering mentally ill individuals "the least restrictive treatment
appropriate,"13 2 it seems only logical that the liberties guaran-
teed to inpatients should be extended to outpatients as well.
130. 495 N.E.2d at 343 (citing Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir.
1980)).
131. See supra Part II.B.
132. See§ 9.60(0)(2).
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IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF KENDRA'S LAW AND
OTHER INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT LAWS
Since its passage in 1999, Kendra's Law has been at the
center of a heated political debate regarding not only the efficacy
of involuntary outpatient commitment laws, but also whether
such laws are morally and ethically proper. In addition to the
legal issues discussed in this Note-whether Kendra's Law poses
a threat to the constitutional liberties of the mentally ill-there is
also the question of whether such laws actually assist the mentally
ill in obtaining the medical attention they need, or if they only
serve to further stigmatize and polarize an already marginalized
and misunderstood population. This Note argues that while
most, if not all, involuntary outpatient commitment laws are well-
intentioned-including Kendra's Law-ultimately, they fail to
assist the mentally ill in any significant manner and contribute to
the stereotype that mentally ill people are violent and uncontrol-
lable without State intervention.
Detractors of Kendra's Law and similar involuntary outpa-
tient commitment laws argue that rather than concentrating our
efforts on coercive treatment, resources should be spent on cre-
ating a wide range of services that would help prevent mentally ill
individuals from "falling through the cracks." Such services
might include intensive case management and outreach, rehabil-
itation, and vocational support, in addition to the already
existing voluntary inpatient and outpatient treatment programs
serving the mentally ill.' Critics of involuntary outpatient com-
mitment programs stress the need for more of these types of
community mental health resources because they believe not
only that coercive treatment programs do not work, but that
coercive treatment programs compromise the dignity of the
mentally ill by relegating them to a less-than-human status.
134
One of the biggest problems of Kendra's Law in the eyes of
some is that coercive treatment, such as the forced administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs, is disguised as healing care for the
mentally ill. 135 While the intent of State legislatures in enacting
involuntary outpatient commitment laws was most likely not to
cause further harm to the mentally ill-indeed, to the contrary,
133. See Elaine Sutton Mbionwu, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: If It
Isn't Voluntary... Maybe It Isn't Treatment, 4 PRoTrcrION & ADvoc. Sys. NEWS 1, 4
(Winter 1999).
134. Id. at 5 ("Peoplehood does not exist in varying degrees. Therefore,
the rights of decision-making, autonomy, and human dignity must be respected
and regarded as sacred at all times and void of society's definition of who is
afforded personhood.").
135. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 17, at 1.
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they are probably well-intentioned-an argument can be made
that the coercive treatment of the mentally ill does more harm
than good. This is not so much because of what the laws do, but
rather what they fail to do.
Robert Bernstein, Ph.D., psychologist and executive director
of the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law in Washington,
D.C., states that "[i]nvoluntary commitment laws are being used
to compensate for the substantial holes in our public mental
health system."136 He argues that rather than improving services
for the mentally ill, "outpatient commitment laws force people to
comply with and accept the inadequate services available in the
community. 1 3 7 Bernstein's statement reflects the belief among
those opposed to Kendra's Law that outpatient commitment laws
are merely "band-aids" covering up gaping wounds in the mental
health system, and that such laws "are not a substitute for ade-
quate mental health services."
138
Another troubling aspect of Kendra's Law, in particular, is
the structure of the New York Mental Hygiene Courts, where
petitions for involuntary outpatient commitment are adjudi-
cated. 139 The Mental Hygiene Courts, which are staffed by state
supreme court judges on a part-time basis, 4 ' were closed to the
public until 1997.141 Even though the Mental Hygiene Court ses-
sions no longer occur behind closed doors, the system still falls
short of providing the type of due process that should be
afforded to those facing a loss of liberty.
4 2
The judges in the Mental Hygiene Court have broad discre-
tion over the lives of the mentally ill:
14 3
Uudges often must make their decision by] weighing the
words of a psychiatric patient against the professional opin-
ion of [a] doctor .... Nojudge or doctor wants to mistak-
enly free a man like Kendra Webdale's murderer, or see a
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 4.
139. See § 9.60(e).
140. See Davis, supra note 21.
141. See id.
142. See supra Part III.A.
143. See Davis, supra note 21:
[T]he courts have the power to decide the essential details of many
mentally ill people's lives long after they have left the hospital. Ajudge
can now rule on many issues: from which medications a patient must
take to whether they spend their days learning word processing or tak-
ing pottery classes. Even such basic decisions as to where to live and
work can now be controlled by the courts.
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deeply troubled patient go off medications and wind up
homeless or dead. So . . . the cards are stacked against a
patient's wishes. The doctor's word is almost always the
law. 1
44
The result is that competent, nonviolent mentally ill persons fac-
ing involuntary outpatient commitment must navigate a system
that, despite its good intentions, has the power to deprive them
of their rights to refuse medication-or even commit them as
inpatients.
145
However, the argument in favor of committing the mentally
ill, in either an inpatient or outpatient setting, before they com-
mit a crime is also a strong one-why wait until a tragedy like the
one that befell Kendra Webdale to occur before taking action?
146
The legislative intent behind many involuntary outpatient com-
mitment laws, including Kendra's Law, is to get the mentally ill
the medical attention they need before they deteriorate to the
point where they present a threat to themselves and others.
1 4 7
But is forcing otherwise healthy, competent adults to take
unwanted medication against their will really the best way to pre-
vent violence, homelessness, and the other social problems asso-
ciated with mental illness?
The results of involuntary outpatient commitment so far,
both positive and negative, seem to suggest that while preventive
treatment is the ideal, it is often not the reality. A study of
patients involved in the 1994 pilot program found that court
orders to take medication had little or no effect on whether or
not a patient was arrested or readmitted to the hospital after
being discharged. 148 On the contrary, access to intensive case
management services, day treatment programs, and therapy indi-
cated a higher rate of mentally ill patients who complied with
their treatment plan-including taking psychotropic medication.
Proponents of Kendra's Law argue that outpatient commit-
ment laws are not only effective, but they save the government
money in the process.14 9 The National Alliance for the Mentally
Ill (NAMI), which supports Kendra's Law and similar outpatient
144. Id.
145. See id. "Judges in mental hygiene cases wield a power no otherjudge
has: the ability to imprison people who have done nothing wrong... 'We allow
courts to commit people to psychiatric facilities if they haven't committed a
crime.'" Id.
146. See, e.g., Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 1.
147. See § 9.60, Historical and Statutory Notes.
148. See Davis, supra note 21.
149. See Martin Kohl, New York State Moves Toward Involuntary Residential
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, PSYCHIATRIC TIMEs, Sept. 1999, at 2.
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commitment laws, has taken the position that "[c]ourt-ordered
outpatient treatment should be considered as a less restrictive,
more beneficial and less costly treatment alternative to involun-
tary inpatient treatment." '50 Therefore, those in favor of outpa-
tient commitment laws argue that while expanding community
mental health services may increase the quality of life for the
mentally ill, programs such as Kendra's Law can accomplish the
same goals while spending less money.
Yet, even if outpatient commitment laws are ultimately cost-
saving to the mental health system, the price paid by the mentally
ill may offset the apparent bargain provided by these programs.
Paul Appelbaum, M.D., Vice President of the American Psychiat-
ric Association, states that while Kendra's Law is unlikely to cost
more than expanding traditional mental health services, it is
probably not a way to save a great deal of money either."' He
also believes that outpatient commitment laws shift the focus
away from providing the mentally ill with the services they truly
need by focusing on cost-cutting: "We ought to talk about these
programs as ways of providing better care for people [and]
ensuring that more people receive the care they need."'52
The sentiments of Dr. Appelbaum are echoed by others in
the mental health community. Jody Silver is an advocate for the
mentally ill with Community Access, an organization that
attempts to assist the mentally ill in leading normal, productive
lives with the assistance of community-based mental health pro-
grams.153 She is also a critic of Kendra's Law, calling it "'a knee-
jerk response to a political and media-driven problem."' 154 Sil-
ver also believes that the reason so many community mental
health services fail to get the mentally ill the help they need is
because of the current budget constraints on such programs.155
While a new proposal by Governor George Pataki provides for an
additional $26.4 million dollars to be allocated for statewide
mental health programs, 15 6 a third of that is specifically
earmarked for case management services for those involuntarily
committed under Kendra's Law-while none of it is specifically
150. Id. (citing NAMI position statements regarding involuntary outpa-
tient commitment laws).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 2-3.
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allocated toward expanding community mental health
services. '
57
Most troubling to critics of Kendra's Law, however, is the
fear that such coercive laws can inspire in mentally ill individuals.
People with mental illness are often skeptical of the system to
begin with, and when the state starts invoking its police power to
take away their liberties, they are less likely to seek treatment vol-
untarily in a community mental health setting. In places like the
District of Columbia, where U.S. Marshals will arrest individuals
who do not comply with their outpatient commitment programs
and civilly commit them as inpatients, 1 8 the mentally ill live in
fear of being confined in the district mental hospital. As Silver
points out, "'There is a kind of terror"' among the mentally ill,
who often do not understand the law well enough to realize that
seeking mental health treatment does not automatically mean
involuntary inpatient commitment or the forced administration
of drugs.159 Thus, the punitive threat of statutes like Kendra's
Law hang over the heads of the mentally ill and coerce them into
submitting to a treatment plan that they may not believe is in
their best interest.
Finally, if involuntary outpatient commitment is a step
toward helping the mentally ill lead more productive lives, it is
certainly not the only step that needs to be taken to prevent the
mentally ill from becoming violent and/or homeless. Aside from
forcibly medicating the mentally ill, what else is being done to
better their lives? In particular, what is being done to help the
most vulnerable and desperately ill individuals?
In New York City, where many of the mentally ill people who
may be affected by Kendra's Law reside, there has not been any
new housing for the mentally ill homeless built since 1997.16°
Before George Pataki became governor of New York, the state
built supportive housing for 9,000 homeless mentally ill individu-
als that provided them with on-site services, access to medication,
and round-the-clock staffing.16" ' The program was a success, with
the majority of the residents remaining in the state-supported
housing and continuing with their medication.
6 2
157. See id.
158. See id. at 3.
159. See Davis, supra note 21.
160. SeeJim Dwyer, Pataki Shut Door, Opened Streets, NEW YoRK DAILY NEWS,
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However, when the. State funding ran out and Mayor
Guiliani requested additional funding to build more housing for
the homeless mentally ill, Pataki denied the request. At the same
time his administration began to shut down state-run psychiatric
hospitals.163 The result was that more mentally ill people, like
Andrew Goldstein, were left homeless and sick, with no place to
go. And while the vast majority of them did not become violent,
Kendra's Law was passed by the New York State Legislature in an
attempt to prevent a similar tragedy from ever happening again.
So would an involuntary outpatient commitment law have
prevented Kendra Webdale's death? While no one can say for
sure, what is clear is that simply forcing Andrew Goldstein to take
his medication, without also providing the support of community
mental health services, would not have been enough. Goldstein
had begged for help; he had voluntarily checked himself into psy-
chiatric hospitals and asked to be given psychotropic drugs.
1 64
Being medicated and left to his own devices was simply not
enough to prevent Goldstein from succumbing to the voices that
plagued him-he needed the assistance of others to help him
navigate through his illness.1 65  Although Governor Pataki
recently approved funding to build some additional funding for
the homeless mentally ill, the proposal does not include 24-hour
care and monitoring for residents.
166
One-third to one-half of the lhomeless population is chroni-
cally mentally ill. 167 Clearly, these are the people that Kendra's
Law was meant to address. However, Kendra's Law fails to
address the greater problem of the homeless mentally ill-lack of
proper community mental health services-and also subjects
mentally ill persons who are not at great risk for violence to
undergo forced administration of medication. If we are to seri-
ously address the issue of violence among the mentally ill, it is
necessary to do more than simply drug them and put them back




165. "Practically every social worker and psychiatrist who saw [Goldstein]
said he needed to live in a place where someone made sure he took the
medicine that shut down his demons." See id.
166. See id.
167. See Dr. Stephen B. Seager, Street Crazy: The Tragedy of the Homeless
Mentallyfll, available at http://www.streetcrazy.com/bksmpl.html.
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V. CONCLUSION
The hard question is-are involuntary outpatient commit-
ment laws, such as Kendra's Law, an affront to the dignity and
autonomy of the mentally ill? It is a debate that is likely to last
for a while, as challenges to the constitutionality of Kendra's Law
make their way through the New York state court system. But as
a matter of public policy, Kendra's Law is a failure not only
because it is overbroad and fails to achieve its stated goals of pro-
viding the mentally ill with much-needed treatment, but because
it ultimately places the nonviolent mentally ill in a position in
which they must submit to the will of the State for fear of losing
fundamental constitutional liberties. Unless Kendra's Law is
reformed to address the due process concerns inherent in forc-
ing the mentally ill to receive treatment, it will remain a prime
example of how good intentions can easily become not only bad
policy, but oppressive law.

